Ο ΤΟΎΡΚΟΣ ΠΡΩΘΥΠΟΥΡΓ¨ΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΥΠΕΤΙΤΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΓΓΟΝΟΎΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΥΜΑΤΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΓΕΝΟΚΤΟΝΊΑ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΜΕΝΙΩΝ

Τους εγγονούς των θυμάτων της γενοκτονίας των Αρμενίων, συλλυπείται ό ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός κ. Ταγίπ  Ερντογάν σε μια μεγάλη κίνηση συμφιλίωσης που θέλει να κλείσει ένα από τα ανοιχτά ζητήματα που στιγμάτιζαν όλη την ιστορία της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας .

Την παραμονή της επετείου των σφαγών που έγινε από την Οθωμανική Κυβέρνηση των Νεότουρκων,  κατά την διάρκεια του Α Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου,  και ιδιαίτερα το 1915,  που διεθνώς γίνεται την 24 Απριλίου , ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός εκδίδει  γραπτή ανακοίνωση σε σε εννέα γλώσσες προς τους Αρμενίους πολίτες της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας και τους Αρμενίους της Οικουμένης . "Συλλυπούμεθα τα εγγόνια , των Αρμενίων που έχασαν τις ζωές τους στις αρχές του 20 αιώνα", " Τιμούμε με σεβασμό και λύπη όλους τους Οθωμανούς πολίτες , ανεξαρτήτως των θρησκευτικής και εθνοτικής προέλευσης που έχασαν τη ζωή τους την ίδια περίοδο και κάτω από ανάλογες συνθήκες", γράφει η πρωθυπουργική ανακοίνωση.

" Η  24η Απριλίου έχει μια ιδιαίτερη σημασία για τους Αρμενίους πολίτες μας και για όλους τους Αρμενίους στον κόσμο και γι' αυτό  αποτελεί μια πολύτιμη ευκαιρία για να μοιραστούμε τις σκέψεις  μας σε ένα ιστορικό θέμα"

"Τα τελευταία χρόνια της Οθωμανικής αυτοκρατορίας ήταν μια δύσκολη περίοδος γεμάτη με πόνο και συμφορές για τους Τούρκους , Κούρδους, Άραβες,  Αρμενίους και εκατομμύρια άλλους Οθωμανούς πολίτες, ανεξαρτήτως της θρησκείας η της φυλετικής καταγωγής",  λέει  ό Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός και τονίζει ότι " η προσέγγιση αυτών των θεμάτων απαιτεί μία κατανόηση απ΄όλους για τον πόνο και τις  συμφορές που βιώθηκαν  εκείνη την περίοδο",

Ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός λέει ότι δεν μπορούν να φτιαχτούν " ιεραρχίες στον πόνο", ούτε "να συγκριθεί ο πόνος και οι συμφορές " .  " Οι συγκρίσεις αυτές δεν έχουν νόημα για αυτούς που έχουν βιώσει τον πόνο"  . "Καθήκον της ανθρωπότητας είναι να αναγνωρίσει ότι οι Αρμένιοι θυμούνται τον πόνο και τις συμφορές που βιώθηκε την περίοδο εκείνη,  ακριβώς όπως κάθε άλλος πολίτης της Οθωμανικής αυτοκρατορίας",

 "Στην Τουρκία , η έκφραση διαφορετικής και ελεύθερης γνώμης για τα γεγονότα του 1915,  είναι προϋπόθεσή για μια πλουραλιστική προοπτική και μια παιδεία δημοκρατίας και νεοτερικότητας ". λέει ό Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός.

"Το να αντλούμε  εχθρότητα από την Ιστορία και να δημιουργούμε ανταγωνισμό, δεν είναι ούτε αποδεκτό ούτε χρήσιμο στο σημερινό Κόσμο, και στην προσπάθεια μας  για την στην δημιουργία ενός κοινού μέλλοντος", λέει ακόμη αό Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός και προσθέτει  ότι .

"Το πνεύμα της εποχής απαιτεί διάλογο παρά τις διαφορές,  κατανόηση, εκτίμηση και συμβιβασμό".

" Οι λαοί της Ανατολής που έζησαν μαζί για αιώνες,  ανεξαρτήτως των διαφόρων φυλετικών (εθνωτικών) και θρησκευτικών διαφορών,  έχουν αποκτήσει κοινές άξιες σε κάθε τομέα,  από την τέχνη μέχρι την διπλωματία από την διοίκηση του κράτους μέχρι το εμπόριο", "Σήμερα έχουν την ίδια ικανότητα να δημιουργούν το κοινό μέλλον τους",  λέει ό Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός

" Ελπίζουμε και πιστεύουμε ε ότι έχουν την ικανότητα να συζητήσουν από κοινού τις απώλειες και τίς συμφορές του παρελθόντος με σοβαρότητα ",  καταλήγει , την ιστορική δήλωση του.

Αποδέκτες της ανακοίνωσης αυτής,  δεν είναι μόνο οι Αρμένιοι και οι υπόλοιποι λαοί της Οθωμανικής περιόδου που διατηρούν την πικρή μνήμη των συμφορών εκείνη στις περιόδου,  αλλά και η σημερινή πολιτική παιδεία στην Τουρκία που βρίσκεται μπροστά σε πολύ μεγάλες προκλήσεις , προκειμένου να λύσει προβλήματα ταυτότητας το οποία συσσωρεύονται από την περίοδο της ίδρυσης της Τουρκικής  Δημοκρατίας,  λένε πολιτικοί αναλυτές .

(α.κ.)

THE MESSAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY,

RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN ON

THE EVENTS OF 1915

The 24th of April carries a particular significance for our Armenian citizens and for all

Armenians around the world, and provides a valuable opportunity to share opinions freely on

a historical matter.

It is indisputable that the last years of the Ottoman Empire were a difficult period, full of

suffering for Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, Armenian and millions of other Ottoman citizens,

regardless of their religion or ethnic origin.

Any conscientious, fair and humanistic approach to these issues requires an understanding of

all the sufferings endured in this period, without discriminating as to religion or ethnicity.

Certainly, neither constructing hierarchies of pain nor comparing and contrasting suffering

carries any meaning for those who experienced this pain themselves.

As a Turkish proverb goes, “fire burns the place where it falls”.

It is a duty of humanity to acknowledge that Armenians remember the suffering experienced

in that period, just like every other citizen of the Ottoman Empire.

In Turkey, expressing different opinions and thoughts freely on the events of 1915 is the

requirement of a pluralistic perspective as well as of a culture of democracy and modernity.

Some may perceive this climate of freedom in Turkey as an opportunity to express

accusatory, offensive and even provocative assertions and allegations.

Even so, if this will enable us to better understand historical issues with their legal aspects and

to transform resentment to friendship again, it is natural to approach different discourses with

empathy and tolerance and expect a similar attitude from all sides.

The Republic of Turkey will continue to approach every idea with dignity in line with the

universal values of law.

Nevertheless, using the events of 1915 as an excuse for hostility against Turkey and turning

this issue into a matter of political conflict is inadmissible.

The incidents of the First World War are our shared pain. To evaluate this painful period of

history through a perspective of just memory is a humane and scholarly responsibility.

Millions of people of all religions and ethnicities lost their lives in the First World War.

Having experienced events which had inhumane consequences - such as relocation - during

the First World War, should not prevent Turks and Armenians from establishing compassion

and mutually humane attitudes among towards one another.

In today’s world, deriving enmity from history and creating new antagonisms are neither

acceptable nor useful for building a common future.

The spirit of the age necessitates dialogue despite differences, understanding by heeding

others, evaluating means for compromise, denouncing hatred, and praising respect and

tolerance.

With this understanding, we, as the Turkish Republic, have called for the establishment of a

joint historical commission in order to study the events of 1915 in a scholarly manner. This

call remains valid. Scholarly research to be carried out by Turkish, Armenian and

international historians would play a significant role in shedding light on the events of 1915

and an accurate understanding of history.

It is with this understanding that we have opened our archives to all researchers. Today,

hundreds of thousands of documents in our archives are at the service of historians.

Looking to the future with confidence, Turkey has always supported scholarly and

comprehensive studies for an accurate understanding of history. The people of Anatolia, who

lived together for centuries regardless of their different ethnic and religious origins, have

established common values in every field from art to diplomacy, from state administration to

commerce. Today they continue to have the same ability to create a new future.

It is our hope and belief that the peoples of an ancient and unique geography, who share

similar customs and manners will be able to talk to each other about the past with maturity

and to remember together their losses in a decent manner. And it is with this hope and belief

that we wish that the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the early twentieth

century rest in peace, and we convey our condolences to their grandchildren.

Regardless of their ethnic or religious origins, we pay tribute, with compassion and respect, to

all Ottoman citizens who lost their lives in the same period and under similar conditions.

" Παγκόσμιο φαινόμενο να κόβεται μια υποψηφιότητα σε ένα κόμμα της Αριστεράς και να διαμαρτύρονται οι οπαδοί της ακροδεξιάς"!, μας λέει ενδιαφέρον άρθρο του Γιάννη Σιδηρόπουλου στο Xanti Press.
" Οσοι έγιναν ξαφνικά ευαίσθητοι ας πάνε τώρα στο Δροσερό της Ξάνθης, να δουν τα αποτελέσματα της «εθνικής πολιτικής» των ιδεοληπτικών ακροδεξιών του Δικτύου 21, των μυστικών κονδυλίων, του φαιδρού Γραφείου του ΥΠΕΞ (αυτού που ίδρυσε ο ακροδεξιός Σαμαράς ως Υπουργός Εξωτερικών κάποτε, για να μην ξεχνιόμαστε). Ας δούνε λοιπόν την επιτυχία όλων αυτών των πολιτικών για ένα γκέτο, το οποίο η Αστυνομία τις νύχτες το φυλά για να μην βγαίνουν οι «μέσα» προς τα «έξω» και φτάσουν στην πόλη της Ξάνθης"
" Ας ψάξει κάποιος να βρει, τι άφησαν στην καθημερινότητα των εξαθλιωμένων κατοίκων τα διάφορα προγράμματα που υλοποιήθηκαν, πόσα χρήματα δαπανήθηκαν και που πήγαν, εφόσον οι κάτοικοι δεν έχουν ανθρώπινες στοιχειώδεις υποδομές, 10 λεπτά από το κέντρο της Ξάνθης. Και το πάρτυ έρχεται με το επόμενο ΕΣΠΑ, για οποίο κάποιοι παίρνουν θέση, αφού οι «ευπαθείς ομάδες» και οι Ρομά είναι το πεδίο που θα αντλήσουν τεράστια ποσά….
" Όλα αυτά, επενδυμένα με το απαραίτητο εθνικοπατριωτικό περίβλημα, της δράσης έναντι του «Τουρκικού Προξενείου». Αρκεί να απαντήσει το ελληνικό ΥΠΕΞ, αν και πότε διαπιστώθηκαν ελείμματα εκατομμυρίων ευρώ στη διαχείριση των κονδυλίων για τη Θράκη και ποια ήταν τα ευρήματα της ΕΔΕ που, ενδεχομένως, διενεργήθηκε. Αν, λέμε…
Τέλος απο τό άρθρο μαθαίνουμε ότι
" Στο εύλογο ερώτημα τί ψήφισε το Δροσερό στις τελευταίες Εθνικές Εκλογές, αρμόδιες να απαντήσουν είναι οι διωκτικές αρχές που έχουν σχηματίσει τρεις δικογραφίες για υποθέσεις παραβίασης της εκλογικής νομοθεσίας με ψηφοδέλτια της ΝΔ και του ΛΑΟΣ ! .....
Στο Δροσερό δεν ψηφίζουν : Βγάζουν απλώς «μεροκάμματο» και εξασφαλίζουν το φαγητό τους για μία εβδομάδα ! Σε αυτή την αλητεία, η Αριστερά είναι η μόνη που δεν ανακατεύτηκε ποτέ και έχει «χαρίσει» το Δροσερό στους υπόλοιπους…."
Και να σας θυμίσω εγώ, ότι το αποτέλεσμα αυτών των ερευνών μπορεί να οδηγήσει σε ακύρωση της εκλογής του γνωστού και μη εξαιρετέου Ευριπίδη Στυλιανιδη !

Ο πολιτικός χάρτης της Τουρκίας

Erdogan Jumps out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire Henri J. Barke

 Erdogan Jumps out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire , Henri J. Barkey writes, and concludes  that "The stability of one-party rule under the “master,” as Erdogan’s followers call him, will prove to be illusory".

Is it so ? 

Prime Minister Erdogan won the day in Turkey’s municipal elections, but his one-party rule will be even more hotly contested as the August presidential election approachErdogan Jumps out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire Henri J. Barkees.

Published on April 1, 2014

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan scored a victory in the March 30 municipal elections, as his party managed to hold on to Istanbul, the most important mayoralty, and received more than 45 percent of all the votes cast. (The city of Ankara was still being contested at the time of writing.) This is despite a massive corruption scandal that cost four ministers their jobs and a series of leaked conversations that revealed the Prime Minister firing and hiring journalists and interfering in news coverage. To prevent further damage, Erdogan also had Twitter and YouTube banned in Turkey.

There are four main conclusions that can be drawn from these elections. First, Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party, AKP, succeeded in defining the election as a referendum on the Prime Minister. The opposition, buoyed by the allegations, fell into this trap. Hence municipal elections, which were supposed to be about local elections, were transformed into a national plebiscite where the opposition was at a distinct disadvantage. In the answer to the proverbial question, “Are you better off today than you were four years ago?”, the Turkish public resoundingly said yes. This strategy also allowed the main opposition party to dispense with concrete proposals and focus on Erdogan, who campaigned in every corner of the country as if his life was on the line. The Turkish opposition parties had proved wanting before and did not disappoint this time.

Second, the AKP also succeeded in making the political opposition seem subservient to the religious leader Fethullah Gülen, who currently resides in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania. Gülen and his numerous followers, who had been allied with the AKP until recently, had decided to take on Erdogan. The reasons are complex, but fundamentally they take issue with his growing dominance at the expense of all other societal and political forces, and also with the overt and unabashed corruption in his government. Erdogan and his supporters denounced the movement, which they blame for the damaging leaks, as an alien organization that had infiltrated the country, a parallel state that was usurping their legitimate authority. The government rebranded itself as victim when all the while it was engaged in a bitter, scorched earth counterattack.

Third, this election undermined the one assurance that had hitherto prevailed in Turkey: that elections (with the exception of the Kurdish areas where the army constantly manipulated the votes in the past) were always fair and clean. Hours after the votes began to be counted, government opponents questioned results in many localities. There were power outages in many districts during the count (one minister, absurdly, blamed a cat), misreporting of results, attacks on pro-Gülen and other opposition media outlets, and countless other reports of irregularities. Many volunteers were mobilized to challenge the results, especially in Ankara and selected districts in Istanbul. Unlike the 2000 Florida recount debacle, where in the end the results were accepted even if begrudgingly, this bodes poorly for the future and the legitimacy of Turkish elections. Unless the AKP allows the Supreme Electoral Council to respond in a constitutionally legitimate manner to the voting irregularities, the damage to the system will be enduring. Turkey lacks the wherewithal to deal with such massive challenges.

Finally and most importantly, these elections have polarized the country in an unprecedented manner. Whereas people who disliked Erdogan and his party had accepted his leadership precisely because he had emerged from fair elections, he is increasingly regarded as illegitimate. His authoritarian behavior has alienated many, but especially the urban and tech-savvy professionals. Erdogan and his supporters likewise dismiss their opponents as illegitimate; they are traitors, tools of foreign powers, and deserve prosecution. Turkey resembles Venezuela today. Erdogan’s victory speech was anything but magnanimous—in contrast to previous such occasions. He repeated his promise to root out members of the “parallel state” from politics and institutions. The problem, of course, is that membership in the “parallel state” is in the eye of the beholder; anyone who has criticized him or otherwise attacked him is eligible. Erdogan went so far as to predict that many of his opponents would leave the country—an echo of his opponents’ earlier claims to the effect that he would have seek refuge abroad. A professor friend of mine who had observed the vote tallies at various precincts told me that after the AKP victory she would not be surprised if she were fired from her job. Such is the climate of fear.

The next battle in this war will begin quite soon. Erdogan has to decide whether or not to run for the presidency in August. For the first time in Turkish history the President will be directly elected by the people, and the victor must cross the 50 percent threshold. The AKP’s haul of 45 percent of the vote is perfectly respectable, but it still comes up short of the 48–49 percent he was coveting.

Ideally, Erdogan would like to assume the presidency and install a subservient person at the helm of the AKP and government. He has an important obstacle here: his long-time colleague, co-founder of the AKP and current President, Abdullah Gül. Gül would either like to stay President or become Prime Minister. With the opposition unable to check Erdogan’s power, Gül has emerged as the de facto balancer to Erdogan. Is Erdogan willing to compromise? We will know soon enough.

Erdogan may have vanquished his opponents at home for the time being, but he has not recovered from the self-inflicted damage he has incurred abroad. The Erdogan brand is severely damaged and diminished. His outlandish accusations against his allies for fomenting coups against him, his open interference in the media, and his ban on social media outlets have made Europe and the United States question his reliability as a partner. He may try to assuage their concerns by opening dialogues with Cyprus and Israel, but it is unlikely that he would be taken seriously as a player. He will be treated merely as the current leader of an important ally.

Will the opposition in Turkey learn from its defeat? Don’t bet on it. One thing Erdogan got right in his victory speech was that, no matter what the latest election results are in Turkey, losers never seem to resign and give way to new blood and fresh ideas. The Nationalist Action Party leader has led his party for almost 17 years despite the fact that his party vote has never passed 15 percent. Similarly, the main opposition party leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu of the Republican People’s Party, has indicated that he not only has no intention of making any changes but also that he stands ready to contest any surprise national election the government may call. Go figure.

Related to the upcoming presidential elections is the Kurdish peace process. In order to pass the 50 percent threshold, Erdogan needs Kurdish votes. The municipal elections made it abundantly clear that the pro-Kurdish party, the People’s Democracy Party, now completely controls the Kurdish regions in an almost contiguous manner. The Kurds will expect significant compromises from Erdogan before agreeing to cast their votes for him.

Increased polarization, with each side vilifying the other, is likely to intensify Erdogan’s already pronounced authoritarian tendencies. It remains to be seen how wide and deep his post-election revenge will be. He may further punish businesses, as he has already done in selective cases, for supporting the opposition, whether in the March elections or in the earlier anti-government demonstrations of May and June 2013.

Turkey is in for a rough ride as both sides mobilize for a “war to the end.” Suspicion, fear, and retribution are likely to be the dominant themes of the coming months. The stability of one-party rule under the “master,” as Erdogan’s followers call him, will prove to be illusory.

Henri J. Barkey is a professor of international relations at Lehigh University.

Turkey seems particularly susceptible to clichés and misrepresentation

Μια σπάνια ειλικρινής (και διεισδυτική) αποδοχή των προκαταλήψεων που δυναστεύουν ότι γράφουμε για την Τουρκία. Οι Έλληνες θα έπρεπε ωστόσο να καταλαβαίναμε καλύτερα... εν τέλει έχουμε μια μεγάλη παράδοση στο να εξηγούμε, στη Δυτική Χριστιανοσύνη, την κατάσταση της αυτοκρατορίας...



There has been a lot of commentary and speculation about what is likely to happen in Turkey now that the country is past the March 30 municipal elections.  The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) resounding tally—44 percent of voters chose the party’s candidates—has renewed questions whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will seek the presidency, about the disposition of the armed forces in Turkish society, and concerning the future of the Gulen movement.  There are also significant accusations of electoral fraud, especially in Ankara.  I have thoughts on all of these issues, but for the moment I will leave them to others.  All the recent attention lavished on Turkey as a result of last summer’s Gezi Park protests, the corruption scandal that broke last December, and now the municipal elections has me ruminating on how to write about the country. This may seem like excessive navel gazing to some, but the way in which analysts and journalists write about other countries (and their own) can have powerful political effects.  Ideas and images can become rooted and shape the way people view a given government or society.  The image of the “Terrible Turk,” for example, is a remnant of the late 15^th century that lives on.
Turkey is no different from other countries, of course: Check out the way the rest of the world portrays Americans.  But in some discrete ways Turkey seems particularly susceptible to clichés and misrepresentation.  One is geography, which leads to endless imagery of the country as “a bridge between East and West” (like fingernails on a chalkboard), another is religion and the fact that 99.8 percent of Turks are Muslims, which is always excellent fodder for discussions of the country’s “perennial kulturkampf between secularists and Islamists.” I have never understood why people writing in English tend to choose the German instead of just “culture war” nor why all pious Muslims are categorized in these tales as Islamists. Then there is the fact that Turkey is the inheritor of a great empire with a fascinating history and some seriously stunning architecture.  I mean, who would take a first look at the “city of 1,000 minarets” without their oriental juices flowing?  Bring on the kebap, water pipe, and harem.
The Gezi Park protests last spring and Prime Minister Erdogan’s war on Twitter have added a whole new dimension to hoary cliché writing.  According to one Wall Street Journal dispatch last week, there is something called the “Gezi generation,” which is apparently made up of angry Turkish hipsters who congregate in the coolly gentrified Cihangir neighborhood of Istanbul and who tweet. This makes good copy, I guess, but it utterly fails to capture the diversity of the worldviews and goals of Gezi Park protesters, many of whom were well into middle age or older, pretty unhip looking, and did not seem to be firing off tweets.  For all the problems the Journal had capturing the complexities of contemporary Turkey, the New York Times’ Alan Cowell subjected his readers to one cheese ball platitude after another in, “Turkey Turns its Back on the E.U.” Here is a sampling:

At the height of the Cold War, Turkey’s great landmass cemented its place in the Western alliance, its huge conscript army deployed across the sweeping expanse of Anatolia to safeguard NATO’s southeastern flank.

I do not know how many times in my life I have read that sentence in one form or another, but Cowell was just warming up.  He the pivots to Turkey’s  “overlapping dilemmas” that are “brought into sharp relief” by—surprise—“ its geography”:

While it straddles Europe and Asia, only a fraction of its soil lies west of the Bosporus that divides the two continents.  For all the boutiques and business of Istanbul that look west to Frankfurt and Milan, the country’s distant east surveys a much rougher neighborhood.

Those two sentences tell us much more about what Cowell does not know about Turkey or the “distant east” than anything else, but he saves the best for last:

While Western-looking, secular, middle-class Turks are frequently hostile to him, Mr. Erdogan and his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party still command the political bedrock among the working class and in the countryside where Islam—Turkey’s dominant faith—is strong.

Never mind the fact that it is hard to talk about an urban-rural divide in Turkey any longer, but Cowell is telling his readers that Erdogan and the AKP keep winning elections because backward people respond to politicians based on faith and “Western-looking people” don’t.  No one would deny the ideological appeal of the AKP to pious Turks, yet Cowell neglects among other things that in the last decade under the Justice and Development Party’s stewardship, more people have healthcare, greater access to transportation, and jobs in addition to the development of an environment where they can express their religious identity openly without fear of persecution. Cowell does not know this so he falls back on what he imagines must be an explanation for Erdogan’s success—Islam.
I did not spend the weekend marinating myself in Edward Said’s Orientalism, but Said is relevant here. Accusations of “orientalism” have become frequent among pro-AKP journalists and commentators in Turkey. It is usually deployed to delegitimize a perfectly legitimate criticism of Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP.  At the same time I understand why Turks might be put out by what is written about them.  Too many observers seem hard-wired to believe certain things about Turkey, notably that geography and religion are the destiny from/to which all else flows. Of course these factors matter, but they do not explain everything in Turkish politics and society.  To believe that is not to be an orientalist; it is to be ignorant.

Στόχος της Χρυσής Αυγής η τουρκική μειονότητα στην Θράκη

 Mέλη της Χρυσής Αυγής έκαναν εκδήλωση στην Κομοτηνή, με σύνθημα «Έξω οι Τούρκοι από τη Θράκη» και εξαπέλυσαν απειλές, καταγγέλλει στον τουρκικό τύπο, ο Πρόεδρος του "Συνδέσμου Τούρκων της Δυτικής Θράκης", κ. Τανέρ Μουσταφάογλου.

Πολλά αλλά μέλη της μειονότητας, τόνισαν ότι δε θα υποκύψουν στις προκλήσεις και επεσήμαναν ότι  «Σκοπός της Χρυσής Αυγής είναι να δημιουργήσει χάος και ανησυχία στην περιοχή" .  "Οι Τούρκοι της Δυτικής Θράκης δε θα εγκαταλείψουν τα εδάφη που ζουν εδώ και 600 χρόνια, επειδή το θέλουν οι ρατσιστές». είπαν .

100 περίπου μέλη της Χρυσής Αυγής συγκεντρώθηκαν στην Κομοτηνή, προερχόμενοι από διάφορες πόλεις της Ελλάδας, και πραγματοποίησαν πορεία κρατώντας ελληνικές και ναζιστικές σημαίες. Μετά την πορεία, μετέβησαν μπροστά στο κτίριο της "Ένωσης Τουρκικής Νεολαίας"  της Δυτικής Θράκης και φώναξαν «Έξω οι Τούρκοι από τη Θράκη». Επίσης μοίρασαν φυλλάδια με υποτιμητικές ύβρεις για τους «Τούρκους» της Δυτικής Θράκης.

«Δεν υπάρχει κανένα πρόβλημα μεταξύ του ελληνικού λαού και της ‘τουρκικής’ μειονότητας της Δυτικής Θράκης. Οι Χρυσαυγίτες έχουν πρόβλημα και με τον ελληνικό λαό. Η πρόθεσή τους δεν είναι τίποτα άλλο πέραν του να χαλάσουν την ηρεμία στην περιοχή.». είπε ό κ. Μουσταφάογλου